Advancing One Biosecurity to address the pandemic risks of biological invasions by Hulme, Philip E.
Overview Articles
708   BioScience • July 2021 / Vol. 71 No. 7 https://academic.oup.com/bioscience
Advancing One Biosecurity  
to Address the Pandemic Risks  
of Biological Invasions
PHILIP E. HULME
The world is witnessing a global rise in numbers of emerging invasive alien species, but identifying which species pose a pandemic threat remains 
poorly understood. The disjointed international regulatory environment presents a significant challenge to biosecurity interventions at a global 
scale. A novel way forward is through One Biosecurity, an interdisciplinary approach to biosecurity policy and research that enhances the 
interconnections between human, animal, plant, and environmental health to prevent and mitigate the impacts of invasive alien species. One 
Biosecurity underpins three initiatives essential to deal with the pandemic risks from biological invasions: new risk assessment tools that look 
beyond national borders toward biosecurity risks of international concern, a stronger regulatory instrument to address biosecurity threats at a 
worldwide scale, and the establishment of a multilateral biosecurity convention responsible for biosecurity governance. Together, these initiatives 
will drive a new science and policy agenda to deliver evidence-based governance of global biosecurity.
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The global response to prevent and contain the    spread of the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus undoubtedly 
represents the most dramatic biosecurity response ever 
undertaken at an international scale. This response contrasts 
markedly with the more muted international and national 
biosecurity strategies to manage emerging pests, pathogens, 
and weeds that negatively affect livestock, crops, or native 
species. This relative underappreciation of the risks arising 
from biological invasions doubtless reflects the fact that the 
global economic costs of recent emerging infectious diseases 
of humans have been huge: $40 billion for SARS-CoV in 
2002–2003, $55 billion for H1N1/09 (swine flu) in 2009, and 
$53 billion for the Ebola outbreak in 2014 (Mackenzie 2020). 
Outside of human health, there are few individual invasive 
alien pest, pathogen or weed species that might account for 
such high economic costs. For example, the global annual 
cost of foot-and-mouth disease in livestock has been esti-
mated to be of the order of $20 billion (Knight-Jones and 
Rushton 2013), whereas, for one of the most widespread 
insect pests of crops, the diamondback moth (Plutella xylo-
stella), the annual costs are thought to be of the order of $4.6 
billion (Bradshaw et al. 2016). But comparisons of individual 
taxa are misleading because the number of invasive alien 
pests, pathogens, and weeds worldwide is several orders 
of magnitude larger than the number of communicable 
diseases threatening human health (Seebens et  al. 2017, 
Webber 2019). Therefore, although scenario modeling sug-
gests that during the twenty-first century global pandemics 
could cost in excess of $60 billion per year (Gostin 2019), 
the annual cost attributed solely to invasive alien insects on 
goods and services worldwide is estimated to be more than 
$70 billion (Bradshaw et al. 2016).
Despite their potentially greater economic costs, the 
more diffuse impacts of invasive alien pests, pathogens, and 
weeds, as well as their less discernible threat to human life, 
have resulted in a suboptimal approach to managing biose-
curity risk at an international scale. The international regula-
tory environment addressing invasive alien species has long 
been recognized as ineffective as a result of strong sectorial 
silos that result in fractured and disjointed decision-making 
(Riley 2005, Shine 2007, De Poorter 2009, Outhwaite 2013, 
Liebhold et  al. 2017). Unfortunately, the world is witness-
ing a global rise in the number of emerging alien species 
(those species never encountered as aliens before) and, in 
the absence of effective international regulations, these spe-
cies pose a significant challenge to biosecurity interventions 
worldwide (Seebens et  al. 2018). Inward-looking policies 
that solely address human, animal, plant, or environmental 
health are no longer fit for purpose because of the signifi-
cant cross-sector impacts of invasive alien species (figure 1). 
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Concepts such as One Medicine, One Health, EcoHealth, 
and Planetary Health have been proposed to bridge these 
sectorial divides, but they also suffer from several limitations 
(box 1). One Biosecurity is an alternative that provides an 
integrated perspective to address the many biosecurity risks 
that transcend the traditional boundaries of health, agricul-
ture, and the environment including zoonotic parasites, vec-
tors of pathogens, pests of agriculture or forestry, and threats 
to biodiversity (Hulme 2020).
One Biosecurity argues for greater harmonization of 
approaches to biosecurity threats affecting, human, animal, 
plant, and environmental health. At the core of the interna-
tional public health response to SARS-CoV-2 is the need to 
address the threat of a pandemic. However, despite many 
invasive alien species having become established on multiple 
continents to the extent of effectively becoming pandemic 
threats (figure 2), biosecurity interventions to prevent bio-
logical invasions rarely target the risk of global proliferation. 
It is time for a shift in biosecurity strategies from the cur-
rent focus of protecting individual countries from invasive 
alien species to a future emphasis on preventing the pan-
demic proliferation of emerging invaders across the globe. 
Therefore, rather than the current paradigm of preventing 
entry to invasive alien species through border inspections 
and quarantine, a more effective approach may be to prevent 
the deliberate or accidental export of emerging threats with 
potential for pandemic invasions.
To address the pandemic risks posed by emerging invasive 
alien species requires fresh thinking to identify more tar-
geted solutions to global biosecurity threats. Using the expe-
riences of international public health in addressing recent 
infectious disease pandemics, three interrelated initiatives 
would appear essential to deal with the pandemic risks from 
biological invasions: an improved approach to risk assess-
ment that looks beyond national borders toward global 
risk, a stronger regulatory instrument to address biosecurity 
Figure 1. Interrelationships between human (couple with wheelchair), animal (cow), plant (wheat), and environmental 
(boar, tick, and thistle) health in relation to the impacts of invasive alien parasites, pathogens, insect pests, vectors, weeds, 
and feral vertebrates. A single example of each interaction is also provided for illustrative purposes. The figure emphasizes 
that a sectorial focus through the International Plant Protection Convention (plant health), the World Organisation for 
Animal Health (animal health), the Convention on Biological Diversity (environmental health), or the World Health 
Organization (human health) cannot capture the multiple direct and indirect effects of invasive alien species on human 
quality of life and well-being. The three links between human, animal and environmental health at the center of the figure 
capture the main areas encompassed by the One Health concept and highlight the much broader scope of One Biosecurity, 
which extends more comprehensively into plant and environmental health.
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threats at a worldwide scale, and the establishment of an 
overarching organization responsible for international bios-
ecurity governance. The following sections discuss how each 
of these three initiatives might improve biosecurity strate-
gies to limit the pandemic threat from emerging invasive 
alien species but also point out several important barriers to 
success that arise from incomplete scientific knowledge, lim-
ited global biosecurity capability, and ambivalent political 
support for multilateral agreements. Overcoming these bar-
riers requires a clear roadmap based on a One Biosecurity 
Box 1. Progressing from One Health to One Biosecurity.
Emerging from the idea of One Medicine, the One Health concept was formalized in 2007 with the aim of bringing veterinary and 
human health closer together because the divide between veterinarians and doctors was seen as an obstacle to addressing the many 
new or reemerging human diseases that come from animals (Monath et al. 2010). Although several definitions of One Health exist, 
the One Health commission (onehealthcommission.org) defines it as “a collaborative, multisectoral, and transdisciplinary approach—
working at local, regional, national, and global levels—to achieve optimal health and well-being outcomes recognizing the interconnec-
tions between people, animals, plants and their shared environment.” One Health has gained considerable momentum and in 2010, the 
WHO, the OIE, and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) agreed to a mandate of sharing responsibili-
ties and coordinating global activities to address health risks at the animal–human–ecosystems interface (Khan et al. 2018). However, 
despite this momentum, the incorporation of environmental perspectives in One Health remains limited. For example, a systematic 
review of the major discipline areas covered in publications addressing “One Health” catalogued in the Web of Science between 2007 
and 2020 highlights that only 7% encompass environmental sciences (see below).
Furthermore, a detailed assessment of One Health networks across the world revealed that one third don’t address environmental sci-
ence at all (Khan et al. 2018). It has therefore been argued that the limited engagement with environmental science severly limits the 
application of One Health to address the global challenges facing human well-being (Destoumieux-Garzon et al. 2018, Essack 2018). As 
a result, alternative concepts such as EcoHealth and Planetary Health have emerged that have a stronger emphasis on the environment 
but these have served only to add confusion as to the best way to address the interface between human, animal, plant and environmen-
tal health (Lerner and Berg 2017). Although wildlife reservoirs, antimicrobial resistance and zoonoses are addressed by One Health, 
other key isues likely to shape how the world addresses the emergence of new threats to human and animal health are poorly covered. 
Despite the significant role invasive alien species play in determining human and animal health outcomes (see figure 1), less than 0.5% 
(12 out of 3952 publications) of the literature addressing One Health examines biological invasions. Important issues that have been 
given scant attention in One Health (and for that matter in EcoHealth and Planetary Health) include the role of international trade 
and human travel, the utility of international protocols for sanitary inspections of imports and exports, the effectiveness of biosecurity 
interventions at international borders as well as at the farm gate, and the functionality of risk assessment tools and forecasts to predict 
future threats. One Biosecurity embraces these areas much more explictly and broadens the concept of One Health to include strategies 
and policies for mitigating risks, provides clearer emphasis on the triggers of the global spread of disease outside of endemic areas, 
and more explictly integrates human, animal, plant and environmental health. After more than a decade since One Health was first 
conceptualised, the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has highlighted limitation to this approach and the need to embed it within a much wider 
framework (de Garine-Wichatitsky et al. 2020, IPBES 2020, Ruckert et al. 2020). One Biosecuirty provides such a framework and in 
contrast to previous concepts, sets out a possible implementation plan.
Disciplines covered in 3952 publications addressing the topic “One Health” published between 2007 and 2020 as catalogued in Web of Science.
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approach that bridges the human, animal, plant, and envi-
ronmental sectors. In the present article, a preliminary road-
map to the implementation of One Biosecurity is presented 
that sets out the advantages and challenges of different 
options in order to stimulate an informed debate concerning 
the quantum leap required to manage biological invasions 
effectively at a global scale. Building consensus among sci-
entists, policymakers, and other stakeholders in terms of the 
best way forward is an essential first step on the long journey 
to designing and finally delivering a practical solution to the 
increasing risk of biosecurity threats worldwide.
Evolving risk assessments to address the pandemic 
threats of invasive alien species
At the core of the international response to emerging infec-
tious diseases is the obligation for countries to determine 
whether an event occurring within their territory might 
constitute a threat to the wider international community 
(referred to as a Public Health Emergency of International 
Concern, PHEIC). To qualify as such a threat, an event 
must meet at least two of the following four criteria: The 
impact must be serious, it should be unusual or unexpected, 
there should be a significant risk of international spread, 
and it could pose a significant risk to international trade or 
travel restrictions (Rodier et al. 2007). These criteria appear 
equally relevant in determining whether an invasive alien 
species has a high pandemic risk potential and could be 
classed as a Biosecurity Risk of International Concern. This 
would identify any emerging invasive alien species that has 
the potential to spread worldwide. However, the application 
of these criteria to biosecurity threats posed by invasive alien 
pests, pathogens, and weeds faces at least four major chal-
lenges to initiating a global biosecurity response.
First, in most invasive alien species incursions (with 
the exception of many pathogens), the species is initially 
identified before any impacts are documented within the 
territory and these impacts may occur several years after 
the first arrival of the species (Jarić et  al. 2019). In stark 
contrast, often a new or emerging infectious disease is iden-
tified by its impact on human or animal health before the 
etiologic agent is identified. Such delays in the diagnosis 
of the etiologic agent of a new disease can be as brief as a 
few months in the case of SARS-CoV and Legionnaires’ 
disease, to several years for HIV, and, in some cases, such as 
Brainerd diarrhea, the agent remains a mystery even after 
several decades of research (Honigsbaum 2019, Osterholm 
and Olshaker 2020). As a result, public health interventions 
to new infectious disease threats are mobilized in response 
to observed impacts rather than simply the appearance of 
a new agent. However, even for widely established invasive 
alien species there remain significant gaps in the quantita-
tive knowledge of impacts on the environment, economy, 
and human health (Kumschick et  al. 2015). For example, 
using the International Union for Conservation of Nature’s 
Environmental Impact Classification of Alien Taxa impact 
framework (Blackburn et al. 2014), data on the environmen-
tal impacts of invasive alien species were deficient for 18% 
of plant species (Rockwell-Postel et  al. 2020), 24% of gas-
tropods (Kesner and Kumschick 2018), 61% of amphibians 
(Kumschick et al. 2017), and 70% of birds (Evans et al. 2016). 
Similarly, although considerable efforts have been made 
to collate information on the economic costs of biological 
invasions, contemporary data only encompass a fraction of 
all invasive alien species (Diagne et  al. 2020). Therefore, it 
is hard to forewarn the world of an impending global threat 
when an invasive alien species impacts have yet to be quanti-
fied (PHEIC criterion 1).
Second, the arrival of a nonnative species known to 
already cause problems in other parts of the world might 
no longer qualify under the criterion of being unusual or 
unexpected (PHEIC criterion 2). Data on potential impacts 
of an invasive alien species are often assembled from exist-
ing literature and risk assessment tools rely heavily on 
evidence of invasion elsewhere (Hulme 2012). The depen-
dence on evidence of invasive alien species impacts from 
other regions to signal a potential biosecurity threat of 
global significance may represent a situation akin to clos-
ing the stable door after the horse has bolted. The fact that 
a species has already caused sufficient problems in other 
parts of the world for its impacts to be documented would 
mean that the invasive alien species of interest would have 
Figure 2. Frequency of with which species listed as 
among 100 of the World’s Worst Invasive Alien Species 
(www.iucngisd.org/gisd/100_worst.php) are recorded 
as invasive in the Invasive Species Compendium (www.
cabi.org/ISC). Although only meant to be representative, 
the taxa included among the 100 of the World’s Worst 
Invasive Alien Species have been widely used to examine 
vulnerability of biodiversity hotspots to invasion (Bellard 
et al. 2014), the impact of climate change on biological 
invasions (Bellard et al. 2013), and regional management 
of invasive alien species (Faulkner et al. 2020). Only 91 of 
the 100 species were recorded as invasive in the Invasive 
Species Compendium, but over two-thirds have invaded 
three or more continents.
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already begun to spread internationally. On the other hand, 
any new or emerging invasive alien species threat with no 
record elsewhere in the world would require that the seri-
ousness of any impacts initially be quantified through the 
collection of original data to confirm its threat status. This 
would likely lead to delays, and therefore, the subsequent 
information on threat status could prove less effective for 
early warning. This could be a significant limitation to 
managing future biosecurity risks given the marked rise in 
the number of emerging alien species (Seebens et al. 2018). 
Thankfully, in most cases, the global spread of invasive 
alien species tends to be measured in years rather than in 
weeks, potentially presenting a crucial window for infor-
mation gathering and dissemination (figure 3). However, 
new risk assessment tools that are less dependent on the 
history of invasion elsewhere are needed.
Third, although the majority of risk assessment 
approaches addressing biosecurity threats evaluate the 
extent to which an invasive alien species might spread 
within a specific target region, they do not address PHEIC 
criterion 3 in relation to the likelihood that a species could 
subsequently spread internationally (Roy et  al. 2018). In 
international public health the distinction is made between 
pathogens of pandemic potential and those of only epi-
demic or regional potential (Osterholm and Olshaker 
2020). Although the precise definition of pandemic has 
been subject to some controversy, a standard definition is 
of an epidemic occurring worldwide, or over a very wide 
area, crossing international boundaries and usually affect-
ing a large number of people (de Campos 2020). Despite 
the considerable concern invasive alien species pose to 
individual nations, relatively few invasive alien species have 
truly worldwide distributions with most restricted to one or 
a few regions of the world (Dyer et  al. 2016, Bertelsmeier 
et al. 2017, Pysek et al. 2017). Nevertheless, many invasive 
alien species have become sufficiently widespread across 
multiple continents (figure 2) that they could be viewed 
as pandemic—for example, Siam weed (Chromolaena odo-
rata), European starling (Sturnus vulgaris), Argentine ant 
(Linepithema humile), Asian kelp (Undaria pinnatifida). 
There have been few attempts to discern why some inva-
sive alien species become pandemic, but recent analyses 
point to an interaction between life-history traits associated 
with environmental adaptability and strong associations 
with effective introduction pathways (Dyer et  al. 2016, 
Bertelsmeier et  al. 2017). Developing new risk assessment 
tools that address the pandemic, as well as the national risk 
of an incursion by an invasive alien species, would appear 
an essential step to identify any future Biosecurity Risk of 
International Concern but would also require an overhaul 
Figure 3. Illustration of the global patterns of pandemic spread for four invasive alien species. (a) The spread of SARS-CoV 
through the international movement of infected humans from China between January and April 2003 (Hempel 2018). (b) The 
global redistribution of the red swamp crayfish (Procambarus clarkii) as a result of escapes from aquaculture (Oficialdegui 
et al. 2019). (c) Worldwide dissemination of the bronze bug (Thaumastocoris peregrinus) on infested plant material to 
regions in which its Eucalyptus hosts have been planted commercially (Machado et al. 2020). (d) Invasion of the harlequin 
ladybird (Harmonia axyridis) following its global transport and deliberate releases as a biological control agent (Lombaert 
et al. 2010). For the sake of clarity, not all known movements of each taxon are represented on the maps. The large circle 
represents the approximate putative origin of the invasive alien species and the dates reflect the most likely arrival in a region.
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of existing approaches to risk analysis and management 
(Leung et al. 2012).
Fourth, although international trade is a major driver of 
the introduction and global proliferation of invasive alien 
species, the feedback to improved regulations to manage 
these biosecurity threats is weak (Perrings et  al. 2010a). 
Invasive alien species can often be introduced to a country 
through trade as a contaminant of agricultural or forestry 
products (e.g., diseases, parasites, pests, and weeds), alter-
natively they may be deliberately imported as a traded com-
modity (e.g., pets, ornamental plants), or are introduced 
as stowaways (e.g., hull-fouling organisms) on or in mail, 
luggage, shipping containers, aircraft, and ocean-going ves-
sels (Hulme 2015b). The effectiveness of regulatory policies 
addressing the risks from contaminants, deliberate imports, 
and stowaways differs considerably (Hulme et al. 2008). The 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) aims to protect 
human, animal, and plant health by reducing the threat of 
introducing pests and diseases of humans, livestock, and 
economically important plants as contaminants of traded 
agricultural commodities (Zahrnt 2011). In many cases, the 
risks to international trade posed by these contaminants of 
agricultural and forestry products are often mitigated by pre-
export treatment (irradiation, heat, fumigation, etc.) of com-
modities (Follett and Neven 2006). Nevertheless, the SPS 
measures have led to several high profile disputes that have 
impeded international trade in relation to the threat posed 
by animal and plant diseases, as well as invasive alien pests 
of crops (Li et al. 2007, Higgins and Dibden 2011, Bown and 
Hillman 2017). Although several countries impose blacklists 
to prohibit the deliberate importation of harmful invasive 
alien species as pets or ornamental plants, these import bans 
usually involve few taxa and at best have a minor impact 
on bilateral or regional trade (Reino et al. 2017). Although 
many invasive alien pests and pathogens (e.g., ants, snails, 
moths) are transported globally as stowaways, with the 
exception of species associated with wood packaging and 
ballast water, there are few international regulations address-
ing how this introduction pathways might affect global trade 
(Hulme et al. 2008).
The foregoing highlights that, under the current regula-
tory environment, there are likely to be few consequences for 
international trade for most incursions of invasive alien spe-
cies bar those that affect agriculture and forestry (PHEIC cri-
terion 4). Furthermore, apart from the SPS agreement, much 
of the emphasis of the management of pathways focuses on 
reducing the risk of importing invasive alien species rather 
than the risk of re-exporting these species to other countries. 
As a result, invasive alien species posing pandemic risks 
such as the Asian house gecko (Hemidactylus frenatus) that 
continues to spread to countries across five continents as a 
stowaway in shipping containers and luggage (Hoskin 2011) 
or the Asian tunicate (Styela clava) that has been introduced 
to ports around the world as a biofoulant on the hulls of 
ocean-going vessels (Dupont et  al. 2010) are ineffectively 
managed. If ports infested with biofouling species of pan-
demic potential were off limits to international shipping or 
countries with a high likelihood of exporting stowaway spe-
cies were prevented from engaging in trade with countries 
at risk from such invasive alien species, the international 
dimension of managing biosecurity threats would change 
dramatically. Therefore, although there are certainly invasive 
alien species of pandemic potential that pose a risk across 
multiple continents, the absence of robust risk assessment 
tools to determine which species have pandemic potential 
and the lack of appropriate international regulations to 
limit the global spread of these species currently prevent the 
mounting of responses of a similar magnitude as a Public 
Health Emergency of International Concern.
Building a stronger international regulatory 
framework for invasive alien species
The value in declaring that an emerging invasive alien is 
a Biosecurity Risk of International Concern is strongly 
dependent on a regulatory environment that facilitates a 
suitable response to a pandemic risk. Once again public 
health initiatives may provide a useful model for such an 
international regulatory environment. The dramatic global 
response to the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has in part reflected 
the effectiveness of the World Health Organization’s (WHO) 
International Health Regulations (2005), a set of legally 
binding obligations, that commit the 196 contracting par-
ties to build capacity in order to prevent, protect against, 
control, and provide a public health response to the inter-
national spread of disease (Jenkins 2017). In particular, 
the International Health Regulations codified the identi-
fication and classification of a Public Health Emergency 
of International Concern (Gostin et  al. 2020). Similarly, 
legal instruments bind contracting parties of the World 
Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) to report excep-
tional epidemiological events (including zoonoses) and 
any emerging animal diseases (Caceres et al. 2017). Driven 
by an understanding of One Health and the links between 
livestock and human infectious diseases, these two legal 
instruments are increasingly becoming harmonized (de La 
Rocque et al. 2019).
In contrast, legal instruments addressing biological inva-
sions by invasive alien pathogens, plants, and animals are 
ineffective or insufficient at both the national and interna-
tional levels, which has led to breaches in authority and poor 
enforcement capacity (Outhwaite 2017). The Convention 
on Biological Diversity (CBD) obliges, rather than legally 
binds, its 196 contracting parties to prevent the introduc-
tion of, control, or eradicate those invasive alien species 
that threaten ecosystems, habitats, or species (Clout and 
De Poorter 2005, Shine 2007). Although it is legally bind-
ing, the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) 
has an exclusive focus on plant health, and, despite the 
fact that the impacts on native plants are considered, the 
emphasis remain largely on the phytosanitary protection 
of ornamental, agricultural, and forestry crops (MacLeod 
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et al. 2010). Long-standing proposals for better integration 
of the IPPC and OIE under either a new or an existing bind-
ing agreement to address alien animals that are not pests 
of plants have had little success (Shine 2007, Ormsby and 
Brenton-Rule 2017). Setting standards for invasive species 
(other than those connected to the cause and distribution of 
known animal diseases and zoonoses) remains outside the 
OIE mandate (Kahn and Pelgrim 2010).
The foregoing highlights that an instrument similar to the 
International Health Regulations could be a potentially pow-
erful tool for managing the pandemic nature of a Biosecurity 
Risk of International Concern, not only as a result of stron-
ger legal basis but also the reporting requirements that 
effectively establish a global monitoring and evaluation 
system. Correspondingly, there have been calls that a global 
framework for managing the biosecurity threats from inva-
sive alien pests, pathogens, or weeds should be closely based 
on the International Health Regulations addressing infec-
tious human diseases (Perrings et  al. 2010a, Perrings et  al. 
2010b, Keller and Perrings 2011). These authors argued that 
bringing the International Health Regulations and the SPS 
agreement into conformity with one another would provide 
a means to build capability in developing countries, improve 
standards for the reporting of incursions and strengthen 
biosecurity responses, although the precise mechanism for 
achieving this goal has not been elaborated (Perrings et al. 
2010a, Perrings et  al. 2010b, Keller and Perrings 2011). 
However, at least three factors limit to the effectiveness of 
the International Health Regulations in preventing and con-
trolling the spread of human infectious diseases and they 
provide important lessons for the usefulness of similar regu-
lations for dealing with more general biosecurity pandemics.
First, despite over a decade of capacity building, only 
one third of countries currently meet the core capacities to 
implement the International Health Regulations because of 
insufficient resources or willingness to comply (Taylor et al. 
2020). The International Health Regulations obliges mem-
ber states to collaborate in mobilizing financial resources 
to improve their core capacity, but the regulations do not 
include any concrete financing mechanisms. Even in coun-
tries in which public health capability is strong, the responses 
to SARS-CoV-2 have been seen as inadequate (Aitken et al. 
2020). Countries are generally overconfident in their ability 
to deal with public health emergencies and this is especially 
true in more developed nations (Tsai and Turbat 2020). 
This parlous state of affairs is likely to also be true for bios-
ecurity capability. Indeed many countries in Africa, south 
and central Asia, Indochina, the Balkans, and South and 
Central America have limited response capacities to address 
biological invasions (Early et al. 2016). Although there have 
been repeated calls to increase the global capacity to man-
age biological invasions (Shimura et al. 2010, Liebhold et al. 
2017, Measey et  al. 2019), there have been few initiatives 
established to achieve this goal. It is evident that even with 
a legally binding international instrument, achieving such 
a goal would require much more investment and a longer 
timescale than previously envisaged. An important first step 
would be to undertake a systematic assessment of the opera-
tional readiness of different countries to prevent, detect, and 
respond to new incursions of invasive alien species, as well 
as the extent to which funds can be easily accessed to address 
biosecurity threats. Only when the extent of the global 
capability deficit is clearly identified would it make sense 
to mobilize sustained multilateral and bilateral partnerships 
to support low-income countries make progress with their 
capacity to deal with global biosecurity threats.
Second, although the obligations under the International 
Health Regulations were intended to facilitate global coop-
eration, nationalistic responses have been evident in the 
reactions to the declaration of a Public Health Emergency 
of International Concern relating to SARS-CoV-2 that 
have seen delays in notifying outbreaks in order to prevent 
potential harm to trade and tourism, as well as avoid pre-
emptive restrictions against the reporting country (Gostin 
et al. 2020). Such nationalist reactions are not unknown in 
the case of outbreaks of invasive alien pests or pathogens of 
agricultural commodities that have led to trade restrictions 
and international disputes (de Miranda 2012, Cardwell and 
Brewin 2019). Furthermore, individual companies may 
fraudulently claim phytosanitary compliance by falsifying 
documentation (Haack et  al. 2014). Unless systems are in 
place to deal with protectionist, fraudulent, or autocratic 
tendencies among nations, broadening legislation to include 
all invasive alien pathogens, plants, and animals could 
increase the risk of international disputes, encourage the 
imposition of further nontariff trade barriers, and disincen-
tivise the reporting of outbreaks.
Third, although individual nations have a responsibility 
to detect a disease outbreak that might represent a possible 
Public Health Emergency of International Concern, it is 
down to an ad hoc technical expert group to review the 
available scientific evidence and assess the severity of the 
outbreak, its potential for international spread, and the likely 
impact on global trade and travel. Critics have pointed out 
that this process is opaque, lacks clear definitions of each 
of the four criteria against which a PHEIC is assessed, and 
often weighs political and social implications over and above 
technical evidence because of the perceived risk of unilateral 
trade and travel measures being enacted by affected coun-
tries (Mullen et al. 2020). These limitations can be addressed 
by designing a more robust decision-making process for 
determining a Biosecurity Risk of International Concern 
that allows for open and independent decision-making and 
moves away from a binary trigger to a tiered system of mul-
tiple levels of biosecurity risk to spur commensurate country 
responses.
Despite the logic of stronger and better coordinated 
legislation to address biological invasions at an interna-
tional level, the world is no nearer that goal than it was a 
decade ago. Developing regulations along the lines of the 
International Health Regulations to tackle wider biosecurity 
threats appears to have merit, at least in terms of ensuring a 
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formal approach to pandemic risks. However, it is evident 
that robust international legislation on its own is no pana-
cea. New international legislation needs to be supported 
by a sizeable investment in financial and human resources 
to ensure global biosecurity capability is fit for purpose. 
Furthermore, there must be a positive economic incentive 
for countries to comply with any new regulatory instrument. 
This is where consolidated, readily accessible data on the 
economic costs of invasive alien species, such as that initi-
ated by InvaCost (Diagne et  al. 2020) would be especially 
valuable. Although it may be tempting to penalize coun-
tries for noncompliance this might only encourage them 
to suppress information on new incursions. Instead, those 
nations that have made progress with compliance despite 
significant economic obstacles should be rewarded through 
more equitable trade agreements or wider access to interna-
tional markets. These issues require a more comprehensive 
approach to global biosecurity governance that could form 
the mandate of a specific organization with oversight of the 
implementation of international regulations and the assess-
ment of pandemic risks.
Establishing an organization with global oversight 
and governance of biosecurity
Despite facing considerable criticism (Horton 2020, 
Mackenzie 2020), the WHO has been the prominent inter-
national voice throughout the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic and 
has helped in coordinating the responses to prevent the 
worldwide spread of the coronavirus, mobilizing research-
ers, issuing regular situation reports, providing country and 
technical guidance, delivering travel advice and disseminat-
ing information to the wider public. Although these actions 
have been especially conspicuous in 2020, they reflect the 
standard operating procedures of global health governance 
that have been implemented whenever infectious disease 
epidemics have occurred (Ruger and Yach 2009). There is 
no equivalent body with an overarching governance role 
in biosecurity or the management of biological invasions 
that would develop normative instruments, lead policy 
dialogue, implement data collection and analysis, facilitate 
information exchange, and strengthen research and techni-
cal cooperation. Although some of this work may be under-
taken through the CBD and IPPC there still remains limited 
coordination between these two conventions (Schrader 
et al. 2010). Furthermore, the limited progress toward inter-
nationally agreed targets to address invasive alien species 
(CBD 2020) indicates the need to change the status quo. But 
long-standing recommendations for a specific convention to 
address biosecurity and biological invasions (Perrings et al. 
2010b, Stoett 2007, 2010) have largely gone unheeded.
In the wake of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, the increased 
understanding of the interplay between invasive alien spe-
cies, public health, and food security, may provide a stronger 
mandate for a specific convention to address biosecurity 
and biological invasions. Such a convention would need to 
encompass an interdisciplinary One Biosecurity approach to 
biosecurity policy and research that builds on the intercon-
nections between human, animal, plant, and environmen-
tal health to effectively prevent and mitigate the impacts 
of invasive alien species (Hulme 2020). Nevertheless, the 
benefits of a dedicated biosecurity convention need to be 
clearly articulated (box 2). This might be done effectively 
by using political sensitivities toward communicable human 
diseases as a benchmark for invasive alien species impacts. 
For example, in the United States the cost of a worst-case 
scenario Zika virus epidemic has been estimated to be 
$1.2 billion (Lee et al. 2017), but the current annual cost of 
the red imported fire ant (Solenopsis invicta) is thought to 
be over $7 billion (Bradshaw et  al. 2016). In addition, the 
international dimension of the problem needs to be empha-
sized more strongly to point out that poor global governance 
means that a particular invasive alien species problem for 
one country today will likely become a wider problem for 
many countries tomorrow. There is considerable scope to 
leverage off the forthcoming assessment of invasive alien 
species undertaken by the Intergovernmental Science-Policy 
Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services to raise 
the value of a dedicated biosecurity convention (Stoett 
et  al. 2019). Furthermore, although some authorities view 
biosecurity as being exclusive to the domain of biodefense 
and dual-use research (Hulme 2020), a multilateral bios-
ecurity convention would have much broader scope and not 
touch on issues of biosafety and bioterrorism covered by the 
Biological Weapons Convention (Cross and Klotz 2020).
Rather than simply acting as a clearing-house mechanism 
to promote technical cooperation and facilitate informa-
tion exchange, the the operation of a future International 
Biosecurity Convention would need to be more proactive 
in reducing the risks from biosecurity threats. Activities 
would, as a minimum, include establishing and running a 
global surveillance and monitoring network to provide early 
warning of new threats, collating and curating open-access 
data on invasive alien species distributions, impacts on 
different sectors and outcomes of management programs, 
implementing standardize risk assessment tools, support-
ing and coordinating the development of game-changing 
management techniques (e.g., gene editing, microbial bio-
control) to combat invasive alien species of global sig-
nificance, generating forecasts of future global biosecurity 
risks under different climate or socioeconomic scenarios, 
unambiguously identifying an invasive species incursion as 
posing a pandemic risk requiring coordinated international 
action, verifying compliance with norms established under 
the convention, negotiating with industries associated with 
the dissemination of potentially invasive species (e.g., pet, 
fur, aquaculture, hunting and fishing, garden industries) to 
limit such trade, instigating accredited training programs 
for biosecurity professionals, and mobilizing capability in 
times of crisis by assembling the International Biosecurity 
Expertise Network. This may appear a huge task, but there 
is already ongoing research to develop standards and proto-
cols for global monitoring networks (Latombe et al. 2017), 
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invasive species distribution data (Pagad et  al. 2018), risk 
assessment tools (Roy et  al. 2018), quantification of eco-
nomic costs (Diagne et al. 2020), and risk forecasting (Essl 
et al. 2020, Seebens et al. 2020).
However, less effort has been invested in assessing and 
responding to the global capability deficit (FAO 2019). A key 
feature of the International Biosecurity Convention would 
need to be the ability to mobilize capability during a crisis. 
Across the world, there are likely to be many thousands of 
skilled individuals managing biological invasions for gov-
ernment departments or nongovernmental organizations. 
Such a resource represents potential standby capacity at a 
global scale that could be mobilized to address biosecurity 
threats of global significance. Experienced technical teams 
could be rapidly mobilized worldwide as the need arises for 
extended missions to provide technical support as well as on 
the ground coordination and assistance of response opera-
tions. For example, highly experienced helicopter pilots 
from New Zealand have led rodent eradications on remote 
islands worldwide, whereas members of the Irula tribe in 
India have been brought in to assist with the eradication of 
Burmese pythons (Python bivittatus) in Florida. Establishing 
the International Biosecurity Expertise Network would 
require the building and managing of a network of govern-
ment, industry, research, and commercial providers who 
could be deployed in biosecurity responses worldwide. Such 
an audit of global expertise would be worthwhile to identify 
specific capability needs in different countries, taxonomic 
impediments to biosecurity responses, and potential com-
plementarity of capability among neighboring countries.
A single coordinating body with a dedicated secretariat is 
essential to bring all these activities together but governance 
could take the form of a networked approach with a mix of 
national, regional, and international organizations, led by 
a high level council of countries that could make demands 
on individual nations that fail to comply to the norms of 
the convention. The International Biosecurity Convention 
would require an adequate budget to deliver its mandate and 
autonomy in how funds are disbursed. It might be expected 
that a more hands-on convention, rather than a technocratic 
body, might require at least twice the funds invested into the 
CBD, perhaps as much as $100 million per annum. This cost 
might be offset by taking on the responsibilities for biosecu-
rity currently included in the budgets of other UN organiza-
tions. Such a proposal would require full support from the 
CBD, the IPPC, and the OIE and a clearer demarcation of 
Box 2. Mapping the long road ahead.
With few exceptions, changes to international legislation and institutional operations tend to occur at a glacial pace, despite the best 
efforts of scientists. The International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments entered 
into force in 2017, after three decades of science, technology and policy development, with the aim to reduce the problem of trans-
oceanic dispersal of marine organisms in ballast water (Gollasch and David 2018). Two decades after a regional approach to tackle 
the problems biological invasions in Europe was recognized by policymakers, the European Union adopted its Regulation on Invasive 
Alien Species in 2015 that committed all Member States to manage specific species of concern (Genovesi et al. 2015). Although nei-
ther initiative is perfect (Gollasch and David 2018, Hulme 2015a, 2016), each has a strong focus on transboundary risk that illustrates 
a multilateral agreement addressing One Biosecurity is possible, albeit the road to implementation can take more than a decade. 
A major stumbling block is the nature of the current international bodies charged with the governance of human, animal, plant, and 
environmental health that have not kept pace with the challenges of increasing globalization and the need for cross-system thinking to 
address biosecurity threats. Previous proposals for binding regulations on invasive alien species have emphasized the need to manage 
biological invasions within a country to protect indigenous biodiversity rather than tackle transboundary risks. Such an approach has 
met with resistance from nation states unwilling to cede autonomy to other parties. Consequently, international organizations have 
primarily provided technical support, whereas nation states have retained their autonomy to manage biological invasions in their ter-
ritory. Unfortunately, biosecurity threats rarely pay attention to governments or borders. For this reason, One Biosecurity requires a 
change in the political mindset away from such unilateralism and self-interest and toward globalism and international solidarity. There 
are signs that this is beginning to happen. Although sovereignty remains an important issue for nation states, recent pandemics are 
indicative of a normative change where the duty to report disease prevalence has often prevailed over the financial and political costs 
of not reporting (Davies 2012, Fidler 2003). The traditional Westphalian model of governance driven by the interest of nation states 
is also changing in the face of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic that has eroded governmental authority and emphasized an increasing role 
of nonstate actors (e.g., NGOs, private sector entities, philanthropic foundations, and academic institutions) and global organizations 
in decision-making (Mackenzie 2020). Even where the response to SARS-CoV-2 has led to increased nationalist or populist rhetoric 
(Welfens 2020), countries are beginning to view biosecurity not merely as a domestic concern but as a foreign policy issue founda-
tional to national security (Horton 2020). Therefore, it would make sense that negotiations over binding agreements are not left to 
technocrats but involve political scientists who can better understand the complexity of interstate relations, the political economy 
of states, different socioeconomic conditions, and geopolitical differences in response (Davies and Wenham 2020). Reconfiguring 
international regulations in such an environment is not going to be easy but there may be reasons for hope. One Biosecurity explicitly 
looks beyond national borders to the risk nation states pose to other countries. This stronger transboundary perspective differs from 
previous attempts to establish binding agreements on invasive alien species. As nations question the future of global governance, the 
opportunity for advocating for a dedicated, multilateral biosecurity convention has never been stronger.
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roles in global biosecurity governance. To adequately fund 
the International Biosecurity Convention would require a 
strong case to be made not only to national governments 
but also the World Bank. There is an appetite for stronger 
biosecurity initiatives to support clean and safe trade in 
several countries including the United States, Australia, New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the member states of the 
European Union. Building momentum among these coun-
tries to drive a dedicated convention would be an important 
first step. The opportunity to gain long-term financial sup-
port from major philanthropic organizations such as the 
Ikea Foundation, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 
Rotary International, and Bloomberg Philanthropies should 
also be explored. It is unclear to what extent biosecurity 
and biological invasions are even on the radar of these 
foundations.
A roadmap to One Biosecurity and the management 
of pandemic biosecurity risks
There is now considerable evidence to support the view 
that the risks posed by invasive alien species to human, 
animal, plant, and environmental health are serious and, in 
the absence of coordinated action, will only become worse 
in the future (Pysek et  al. 2020). Unfortunately, the inter-
national regulatory environment has not kept pace with 
these developments and is no longer fit for purpose to deal 
with the cross-sectorial nature of biosecurity threats. The 
problem of inadequate international biosecurity governance 
was identified by multiple authors over a decade ago (Kahn 
and Pelgrim 2010, Perrings et al. 2010b, Riley 2009, Shimura 
et  al. 2010, Stoett 2010), but there has been no progress 
toward any resolution despite the increasing pressure arising 
from biosecurity threats worldwide.
Developing a new regulatory instrument such as the 
International Biosecurity Convention will undoubtedly be 
complex but can be perceived as requiring at least seven 
major steps (figure 4). Initially the One Biosecurity concept 
must capture the imagination of scientists and policymak-
ers alike (step 1). Adopting a One Biosecurity approach 
would facilitate the comparison of relative risks across the 
human, animal, plant, and environmental health sectors. A 
short-term goal should be a memorandum of understand-
ing negotiated among the WHO, the OIE, the IPCC, and 
the CBD to coordinate global activities addressing One 
Biosecurity. Such a memorandum should explore the strong 
interrelationships between the impacts of invasive alien spe-
cies on different sectors (figure 1). Building on the increas-
ing public sensitivity around public health arising from the 
SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, communication should focus on 
the impact on human quality of life and well-being, be it 
through emerging infectious diseases and zoonoses, or other 
health implications such as toxins and allergens in water, 
food, or in the air, or via impacts on the quantity, quality, or 
affordability of food (Hulme 2020).
Attracting financing from governments and especially 
philanthropic foundations will require using a common 
language regarding biosecurity threats that is not sector 
specific but is also fundamentally human centric. This 
needs to be facilitated by the production of objective and 
reproducible data on the national, regional, and global 
environmental, economic, and health costs of invasive alien 
species presented in terms of impacts on human quality of 
life and well-being (step 2). This would then need to be fol-
lowed up by projections of how these costs could increase 
in the future without the intervention of dedicated bios-
ecurity convention to illustrate the considerable return on 
investment on a multilateral binding agreement. Statements 
regarding impacts should be put into a context that the pub-
lic can relate to more personally and this means that global 
estimates may be less effective than national or regional cost 
estimates that affect the taxpayer. However, statements such 
as “biological invasions cost the global economy $2 trillion” 
while sounding impressive present the issue in abstract 
terms and most people find it hard to process such large 
sums and compare their relative value (Madison et al. 2012). 
Governments will first want to protect the national interest 
before embarking on multilateral initiative. As an example, 
in the United States the economic costs in terms of losses 
and damages of the European starling has been estimated to 
be $800 million, this abstract value will have more impact 
when it can be shown to be more than the annual public 
health costs of West Nile virus ($631 million) or the average 
hospitalization costs of influenza outbreaks ($300 million) 
each year (Pimentel et al. 2005).
Figure 4. Outline of a possible implementation plan for 
the International Biosecurity Convention highlighting 
seven key steps and the relative role of scientists and 
policymakers at each step.
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But in addition to building the evidence base, scientists 
need to develop the tools necessary for implementation 
of a new instrument (step 3). One Biosecurity seeks the 
development of a suite of more holistic risk assessment 
tools for the comparative assessment of biosecurity threats 
across the human, animal, plant, and environmental health 
sectors. Invasion scientists need to work with veterinarians 
and epidemiologists to devise a standardized quantitative 
approach to rapidly assess actual and potential impacts of 
emerging invasive alien species across all sectors, rather than 
being sector specific (Hulme et al. 2020). In addition, these 
tools should capture both the epidemic and pandemic risk 
of emerging invasive alien species to present transparent 
and unambiguous assessments of invasive alien species that 
represent a Biosecurity Risk of International Concern. These 
risk assessment tools could be incorporated within a Global 
Biosecurity Threat Index that captures the vulnerability of 
nations to biological invasions and highlights how capability 
and infrastructural deficits could be resolved.
Because invasive alien species transcend the traditional 
borders of human, animal, plant, and environmental 
health, any development of the International Biosecurity 
Convention would need to work with other conventions 
and organizations to avoid duplication but also better coor-
dinate activities across sectors. Therefore, the International 
Biosecurity Convention must be a partnership that harmo-
nizes existing standards and protocols in such a way as to 
not disadvantage any one sector but also introduces a more 
rigorous and effective approach to global biosecurity gover-
nance and the management of pandemic threats. Existing 
conventions and organizations whose mandates touch on 
biosecurity and invasive alien species (e.g., WHO, OIE, 
IPPC, CBD) must recognize that the sectorial approach to 
managing these risks in ineffective and that a more holistic 
view is essential to address this problem (figure 1). However, 
there are multiple ways this might be achieved, and alterna-
tive models of governance would need to be explored. Some 
options might include a dedicated new UN organization that 
would oversee the International Biosecurity Convention, an 
existing UN organization (e.g., OIE, IPCC, CBD, WHO) that 
would support the new instrument, or a network of UN bod-
ies that would cooperatively deliver the new instrument. The 
costs and benefits of these and other options would need 
to be explored in relation to delivery of specific outcomes, 
and the pros and cons of each option put to wider consulta-
tion (step 4). Discussion and consultation on the form of a 
new legally binding instrument may take several years and 
existing organizations or conventions may be unwilling to 
relinquish authority over their sectorial interests. Depending 
on the outcome of the analysis of different governance mod-
els, a proposal for a new legally binding instrument would 
need to be drafted and then ratified by contracting parties 
(step 5). It should be noted, however, that ratification took 
over a decade in the case of the International Convention 
for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and 
Sediments (Gollasch and David 2018).
How would the International Biosecurity Convention be 
implemented (step 6)? Today, biosecurity threats are man-
aged through inspection of cargo, mail, commodities, and 
shipping vessels; surveillance of new species incursions; and, 
in some cases, black or white lists relating to trade restric-
tions of specific species (Hulme 2011, 2014). This focus is 
exclusively on the risks entering a country rather than dis-
semination beyond national borders. These strategies would 
still be important in addressing pandemic risk, but they 
would need to be extended to support cleaner trade and 
human travel. For example, biosecurity authorities would 
have a responsibility of ensuring all containers leaving their 
borders were cleaned to an international standard to exclude 
stowaway organisms. Quaysides, warehouses, and airports 
dealing with commodities for export would be required to 
implement pest management programs using pheromone 
traps, bait stations, and pesticides to reduce risk of contami-
nation of commodities (especially untreated wood products) 
and containers. These high risk sites for both the introduc-
tion and export of invasive alien species should form an 
international network that shares real-time information 
on interceptions and inspections of material entering and 
leaving individual countries and applies agreed surveillance 
protocols and common data standards that would be sub-
ject to third party quality control and verification. Many of 
these actions are extensions of current practices and should 
therefore be straightforward to implement. Greater effort 
would need to be invested in ensuring wharf structures and 
hard surfaces in harbors were free from high risk biofoul-
ing organisms and this would involve the development and 
application of environmentally friendly antifouling paints 
and redesign of artificial marine structures to allow effective 
cleaning. Perhaps most challenging would be the introduc-
tion of biosecurity screening before passenger and com-
modity departure rather than at the port of arrival. Under 
these circumstances, there would be a natural means of 
verification when goods or people arrived at their destina-
tion. High interception rates would point to noncompliance 
at the country of origin and initiate international warnings 
and increased scrutiny of exports and passengers from that 
country. Making nations, rather than individuals or compa-
nies, responsible for biosecurity breaches would strengthen 
the international regulatory regime.
Finally, the International Biosecurity Convention would 
need to be evaluated every 5 years (step 7) to ensure it 
remains fit for purpose. The criteria for evaluation could 
include progressive reduction in the vulnerabilities of 
countries to biosecurity threats (as measured by the 
Global Biosecurity Threat Index) as their national capa-
bilities improve, a reduced rate of successive incursions 
of high pandemic risk pests, pathogens, and weeds from 
country to country (e.g., fewer cases of a Biosecurity Risk 
of International Concern), greater international coop-
eration through the International Biosecurity Expertise 
Network to address invasive alien species and an expanded 
catalogue of invasive alien species for which biosecurity 
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risk assessments have been undertaken. It is impos-
sible to know precisely how long each of the steps toward 
implementation might take but the entire process would 
certainly take no less than a decade and likely longer. 
Therefore, scientists and policymakers working with bios-
ecurity threats must be prepared to a long-term commit-
ment to delivering One Biosecurity.
Conclusions
There must be a better way to manage the increased threat 
of invasive alien species to human health, agriculture, and 
the environment worldwide. A novel way forward is through 
the application of One Biosecurity, an interdisciplinary 
approach to biosecurity policy, and research that builds on 
the interconnections between human, animal, plant, and 
environmental health to prevent and mitigate the impacts 
of invasive alien species more effectively. At an international 
level, One Biosecurity leads the way to a clearer focus on 
the pandemic risks of invasive alien species and provides 
an opportunity to learn from the successes and failures of 
similar initiatives targeting global public health. Such a com-
parison highlights that the global governance of biosecurity 
threats requires the implementation of three interrelated 
initiatives: an improved approach to risk assessment that 
looks beyond national borders toward the pandemic risk 
of an invasive alien species and identifies when it might 
become a Biosecurity Risk of International Concern; a 
specific international regulatory instrument, modeled on 
the International Health Regulations, to enforce proactive 
surveillance and response to biosecurity threats worldwide; 
and the establishment of a dedicated, multilateral bios-
ecurity convention responsible for international biosecurity 
governance. None of these initiatives will be sufficient on 
its own. Developing effective tools to assess the likelihood 
that an emerging invasive alien species poses a Biosecurity 
Risk of International Concern underpins the deployment 
of international regulations committing nations to the 
monitoring and reporting of these risks. Once international 
regulations can be agreed and ratified by a sufficient number 
of nations, the International Biosecurity Convention could 
come into force and initiate the multiple activities expected 
of its mandate. However, the essential groundwork for these 
activities such as data management systems, gap analyses of 
biosecurity capability, improved regional coordination of 
biosecurity response should be in place beforehand. These 
activities would give a stronger global direction to research 
on biological invasions, bringing different sets of expertise 
together across different countries in a more coordinated 
and applied context. Building belief among scientists, indus-
try, policymakers, and potential funders that there is a long-
term strategy to manage biological invasions will be key.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank three anonymous referees 
and the handling editor for constructive comments on an 
earlier draft of the article.
References cited
Aitken T, Chin KL, Liew D, Ofori-Asenso R. 2020. Rethinking pandemic 
preparation: Global Health Security Index (GHSI) is predictive of 
COVID-19 burden, but in the opposite direction. Journal of Infection 
81: 353–355.
Bellard C, Thuiller W, Leroy B, Genovesi P, Bakkenes M, Courchamp F. 
2013. Will climate change promote future invasions? Global Change 
Biology 19: 3740–3748.
Bellard C, Leclerc C, Leroy B, Bakkenes M, Veloz S, Thuiller W, Courchamp 
F. 2014. Vulnerability of biodiversity hotspots to global change. Global 
Ecology and Biogeography 23: 1376–1386.
Bertelsmeier C, Ollier S, Liebhold A, Keller L. 2017. Recent human history 
governs global ant invasion dynamics. Nature Ecology and Evolution 
1: 0184.
Blackburn TM, et  al. 2014. A unified classification of alien species based 
on the magnitude of their environmental impacts. PLOS Biology 
12: 11.
Bown CP, Hillman JA. 2017. Foot-and-mouth disease and Argentina’s 
beef exports: The WTO’s US-animals dispute. World Trade Review 16: 
253–277.
Bradshaw CJA, Leroy B, Bellard C, Roiz D, Albert C, Fournier A, 
Barbet-Massin M, Salles J-M, Simard F, Courchamp F. 2016. Massive 
yet grossly underestimated global costs of invasive insects. Nature 
Communications 7: 12986.
Caceres P, Awada L, Barboza P, Lopez-Gatell H, Tizzani P. 2017. The World 
Organisation for Animal Health and the World Health Organization: 
Intergovernmental disease information and reporting systems and 
their role in early warning. Revue Scientifique et Technique: Office 
International des Epizooties 36: 539–548.
Cardwell R, Brewin DG. 2019. Blackleg or blackmail? Economics of the 
Canada–China canola trade dispute. Canadian Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 67: 251–260.
CBD. 2020. Global Biodiversity Outlook 5. Secretariat of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity.
Clout MN, De Poorter M. 2005. International initiatives against invasive 
alien species. Weed Technology 19: 523–527.
Cross G, Klotz L. 2020. Twenty-first century perspectives on the Biological 
Weapon Convention: Continued relevance or toothless paper tiger. 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 76: 185–191.
Davies SE. 2012. The international politics of disease reporting: Towards 
post-Westphalianism? International Politics 49: 591–613.
Davies SE, Wenham C. 2020. Why the COVID-19 response needs 
International Relations. International Affairs 96: 1227–1251.
de Campos TC. 2020. The traditional definition of pandemics, its moral 
conflations, and its practical implications: A defense of conceptual 
clarity in global health laws and policies. Cambridge Quarterly of 
Healthcare Ethics 29: 205–217.
de Garine-Wichatitsky M, Binot A, Morand S, Kock R, Roger F, Wilcox BA, 
Caron A. 2020. Will the COVID-19 crisis trigger a One Health coming-
of-age? Lancet Planetary Health 4: E377–E378.
de La Rocque S, et al. 2019. One Health operations: A critical component 
in the international health regulations monitoring and evaluation 
framework. Revue Scientifique et Technique: Office International des 
Epizooties 38: 303–314.
de Miranda SHG. 2012. Evaluating WTO institutions for resolving trade 
disputes involving non-tariff measures: Four cases involving Brazil. 
Pages 197–214 in Brouwer F, Fox G, Jongeneel R, eds. The Economics 
of Regulation In Agriculture: Compliance with Public and Private 
Standards. CABI.
De Poorter M. 2009. International legal instruments and frameworks 
for invasive species. Pages 108–125 in Clout MN, Williams PA, 
eds. Invasive Species Management: A Handbook of Principles and 
Techniques. Oxford University Press.
Destoumieux-Garzon D, et al. 2018. The One Health concept: 10 years old 
and a long road ahead. Frontiers in Veterinary Science 5: 14.
Diagne C, Leroy B, Gozlan RE, Vaissiere AC, Assailly C, Nuninger L, Roiz 
D, Jourdain F, Jaric I, Courchamp F. 2020. InvaCost, a public database 






/bioscience/article/71/7/708/6158362 by Lincoln U
niversity Library user on 13 July 2021
Overview Articles
720   BioScience • July 2021 / Vol. 71 No. 7 https://academic.oup.com/bioscience
of the economic costs of biological invasions worldwide. Scientific Data 
7: 277.
Dupont L, Viard F, Davis MH, Nishikawa T, Bishop JDD. 2010. Pathways 
of spread of the introduced ascidian Styela clava (Tunicata) in Northern 
Europe, as revealed by microsatellite markers. Biological Invasions 12: 
2707–2721.
Dyer EE, Franks V, Cassey P, Collen B, Cope RC, Jones KE, Sekercioglu 
CH, Blackburn TM. 2016. A global analysis of the determinants of alien 
geographical range size in birds. Global Ecology and Biogeography 25: 
1346–1355.
Early R, et al. 2016. Global threats from invasive alien species in the twenty-
first century and national response capacities. Nature Communications 
7: 12485.
Essack SY. 2018. Environment: The neglected component of the One Health 
triad. Lancet Planetary Health 2: E238–E239.
Essl F, et al. 2020. Drivers of future alien species impacts: An expert-based 
assessment. Global Change Biology 26: 4880–4893.
Evans T, Kumschick S, Blackburn TM. 2016. Application of the 
Environmental Impact Classification for Alien Taxa (EICAT) to a 
global assessment of alien bird impacts. Diversity and Distributions 22: 
919–931.
[FAO] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 2019. 
Strategic Framework for the International Plant Protection Convention 
(IPPC) 2020–2030. FAO.
Faulkner KT, Robertson MP, Wilson JRU. 2020. Stronger regional biosecu-
rity is essential to prevent hundreds of harmful biological invasions. 
Global Change Biology 26: 2449–2462.
Fidler DP. 2003. SARS: Political pathology of the first post-Westphalian 
pathogen. Journal of Law Medicine and Ethics 31: 485–505.
Follett PA, Neven LG. 2006. Current trends in quarantine entomology. 
Annual Review of Entomology 51: 359–385.
Genovesi P, Carboneras C, Vila M, Walton P. 2015. EU adopts innovative 
legislation on invasive species: A step towards a global response to bio-
logical invasions? Biological Invasions 17: 1307–1311.
Gollasch S, David M. 2018. Ballast Water Management Convention imple-
mentation challenges. Ocean Yearbook 32: 456–476.
Gostin LO. 2019. Global health security in an era of explosive pandemic 
potential. Asian Journal of WTO and International Health Law and 
Policy 14: 267–285.
Gostin LO, Habibi R, Meier BM. 2020. Has global health law risen to 
meet the COVID-19 challenge? Revisiting the International Health 
Regulations to prepare for future threats. Journal of Law Medicine and 
Ethics 48: 376–381.
Haack RA, et  al. 2014. Effectiveness of the International Phytosanitary 
Standard ISPM No. 15 on reducing wood borer infestation rates in wood 
packaging material entering the United States. PLOS ONE 9: e96611.
Hempel S. 2018. The Atlas of Disease: Mapping Deadly Epidemics and 
Contagion, From the Plague to the Zika Virus. White Lion.
Higgins V, Dibden J. 2011. Biosecurity, trade liberalisation, and the 
(anti)politics of risk analysis: The Australia–New Zealand apples 
dispute. Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space 43: 
393–409.
Honigsbaum M. 2019. The Pandemic Century: One Hundred Years of 
Panic, Hysteria, and Hubris. Oxford University Press.
Horton R. 2020. The COVID-19 Catastrophe: What’s Gone Wrong and 
How to Stop It Happening Again. Polity Press.
Hoskin CJ. 2011. The invasion and potential impact of the Asian House 
Gecko (Hemidactylus frenatus) in Australia. Austral Ecology 36: 
240–251.
Hulme PE. 2011. Biosecurity: The changing face of invasion biology. Pages 
301–314 in Richardson DM, ed. Fifty Years of Invasion Ecology: The 
Legacy of Charles Elton. Wiley.
Hulme PE. 2012. Weed risk assessment: A way forward or a waste of time? 
Journal of Applied Ecology 49: 10–19.
Hulme PE. 2014. An introduction to plant biosecurity: Past, present, and 
future. Pages 1–25 in Gordh G, McKirdy S, eds. The Handbook of Plant 
Biosecurity. Springer.
Hulme PE. 2015a. New law risks release of invasive species. Nature 517: 
21–21.
Hulme PE. 2015b. Invasion pathways at a crossroad: Policy and research 
challenges for managing alien species introductions. Journal of Applied 
Ecology 52: 1418–1424.
Hulme PE. 2016. Coordinate efforts on EU invasive species. Science 353: 
998–998.
Hulme PE. 2020. One Biosecurity: A unified concept to integrate human, 
animal, plant, and environmental health. Emerging Topics in Life 
Sciences 4: 539–549.
Hulme PE, Baker R, Freckleton R, Hails RS, Hartley M, Harwood J, Marion 
G, Smith GC, Williamson M. 2020. The Epidemiological Framework 
for Biological Invasions (EFBI): An interdisciplinary foundation for the 
assessment of biosecurity threats. NeoBiota 62: 161–192.
Hulme PE, et  al. 2008. Grasping at the routes of biological invasions: A 
framework for integrating pathways into policy. Journal of Applied 
Ecology 45: 403–414.
[IPBES] Secretariat of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform 
on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services. 2020. Workshop Report on 
Biodiversity and Pandemics of the Intergovernmental Platform on 
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services Bonn. IPBES.
Jarić I, Heger T, Castro Monzon F, Jeschke JM, Kowarik I, McConkey KR, 
Pyšek P, Sagouis A, Essl F. 2019. Crypticity in biological invasions. 
Trends in Ecology and Evolution 34: 291–302.
Jenkins B. 2017. The Global Health Security Agenda and the role of 
the World Organisation for Animal Health. Revue Scientifique et 
Technique: Office International des Epizooties 36: 639–645.
Kahn S, Pelgrim W. 2010. The role of the World Trade Organization and 
the ‘three sisters’ (the World Organisation for Animal Health, the 
International Plant Protection Convention and the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission) in the control of invasive alien species and the preservation 
of biodiversity. Revue Scientifique et Technique: Office International 
des Epizooties 29: 411–417.
Keller RP, Perrings C. 2011. International policy options for reduc-
ing the environmental impacts of invasive species. BioScience 61: 
1005–1012.
Kesner D, Kumschick S. 2018. Gastropods alien to South Africa cause 
severe environmental harm in their global alien ranges across habitats. 
Ecology and Evolution 8: 8273–8285.
Khan MS, Rothman-Ostrow P, Spencer J, Hasan N, Sabirovic M, Rahman-
Shepherd A, Shaikh N, Heymann DL, Dar O. 2018. The growth and 
strategic functioning of One Health networks: A systematic analysis. 
Lancet Planetary Health 2: E264–E273.
Knight-Jones TJD, Rushton J. 2013. The economic impacts of foot and 
mouth disease: What are they, how big are they, and where do they 
occur? Preventive Veterinary Medicine 112: 161–173.
Kumschick S, Vimercati G, de Villiers FA, Mokhatla MM, Davies SJ, Thorp 
CJ, Rebelo AD, Measey GJ. 2017. Impact assessment with different scor-
ing tools: How well do alien amphibian assessments match? NeoBiota 
33: 53–66.
Kumschick S, et al. 2015. Ecological impacts of alien species: Quantification, 
scope, caveats, and recommendations. BioScience 65: 55–63.
Latombe G, et al. 2017. A vision for global monitoring of biological inva-
sions. Biological Conservation 213: 295–308.
Lee BY, Alfaro-Murillo JA, Parpia AS, Asti L, Wedlock PT, Hotez PJ, Galvani 
AP. 2017. The potential economic burden of Zika in the continental 
United States. PLOS Neglected Tropical Diseases 11: e0005531.
Lerner H, Berg C. 2017. A comparison of three holistic approaches to 
health: One Health, EcoHealth, and Planetary Health. Frontiers in 
Veterinary Science 4: 163–163.
Leung B, et al. 2012. TEASIng apart alien species risk assessments: A frame-
work for best practices. Ecology Letters 15: 1475–1493.
Li R, Buongiorno J, Zhu S, Turner JA, Prestemon J. 2007. Potential eco-
nomic impact of limiting the international trade of timber as a phytos-
anitary measure. International Forestry Review 9: 514–525.
Liebhold AM, Brockerhoff EG, Nunez MA. 2017. Biological inva-
sions in forest ecosystems: A global problem requiring 






/bioscience/article/71/7/708/6158362 by Lincoln U
niversity Library user on 13 July 2021
Overview Articles
https://academic.oup.com/bioscience  July 2021 / Vol. 71 No. 7 • BioScience   721 
international and multidisciplinary integration. Biological Invasions 19: 
3073–3077.
Lombaert E, Guillemaud T, Cornuet J-M, Malausa T, Facon B, Estoup A. 
2010. Bridgehead effect in the worldwide invasion of the biocontrol 
harlequin ladybird. PLOS ONE 5: e9743.
Machado DdN, et  al. 2020. One maternal lineage leads the expansion of 
Thaumastocoris peregrinus (Hemiptera: Thaumastocoridae) in the New 
and Old Worlds. Scientific Reports 10: 3487.
Mackenzie D. 2020. COVID-19: The Pandemic that Never Should Have 
Happened and How to Stop the Next One. The Bridge Street Press.
MacLeod A, Pautasso M, Jeger MJ, Haines-Young R. 2010. Evolution of the 
international regulation of plant pests and challenges for future plant 
health. Food Security 2: 49–70.
Madison BL, Boersma S, Diefenderfer CL, Dingman SW. 2012. Case Studies 
for Quantitative Reasoning: A Casebook of Media Articles. Pearson 
Learning Solutions.
Measey J, Visser V, Dgebuadze Y, Inderjit, Li B, Dechoum MS, Ziller SR, 
Richardson DM. 2019. The world needs BRICS countries to build 
capacity in invasion science. PLOS Biology 17: 7.
Monath TP, Kahn LH, Kaplan B. 2010. Introduction: One Health perspec-
tive. ILAR Journal 51: 193–198.
Mullen L, Potter C, Gostin LO, Cicero A, Nuzzo JB. 2020. An analysis of 
International Health Regulations emergency committees and public 
health emergency of international concern Designations. BMJ Global 
Health 5: e002502.
Oficialdegui FJ, Clavero M, Sánchez MI, Green AJ, Boyero L, Michot TC, 
Klose K, Kawai T, Lejeusne C. 2019. Unravelling the global invasion 
routes of a worldwide invader, the red swamp crayfish (Procambarus 
clarkii). Freshwater Biology 64: 1382–1400.
Ormsby M, Brenton-Rule E. 2017. A review of global instruments to combat 
invasive alien species in forestry. Biological Invasions 19: 3355–3364.
Osterholm MT, Olshaker M. 2020. Deadliest Enemy: Our War against Killer 
Germs. Little Brown Spark.
Outhwaite O. 2013. Legal frameworks for biosecurity. Pages 75–90 in 
Dobson A, Barker K, L. TS, eds. Biosecurity: The Socio-Politics of 
Invasive Species and Infectious Diseases. Routledge.
Outhwaite O. 2017. Biosecurity, invasive species and the law. Pages 83–97 
in McManis CR, Ong B, eds. Routledge Handbook of Biodiversity and 
the Law. Routledge.
Pagad S, Genovesi P, Carnevali L, Schigel D, McGeoch MA. 2018. 
Introducing the Global Register of Introduced and Invasive Species. 
Scientific Data 5: 170202.
Perrings C, Burgiel S, Lonsdale M, Mooney H, Williamson M. 2010a. 
International cooperation in the solution to trade-related inva-
sive species risks. Year in Ecology and Conservation Biology 1195: 
198–212.
Perrings C, Burgiel S, Lonsdale M, Mooney H, Williamson M. 2010b. 
Globalization and bioinvasions: The international policy problem. 
Pages 235–250 in Perrings C, Mooney HA, Williamson M, eds. 
Bioinvasions and Globalization. Ecology, Economics, Management, and 
Policy. Oxford University Press.
Pimentel D, Zuniga R, Morrison D. 2005. Update on the environmental 
and economic costs associated with alien-invasive species in the United 
States. Ecological Economics 52: 273–288.
Pysek P, et al. 2020. Scientists’ warning on invasive alien species. Biological 
Reviews 95: 1511–1534.
Pysek P, et al. 2017. Naturalized alien flora of the world: Species diversity, 
taxonomic and phylogenetic patterns, geographic distribution and 
global hotspots of plant invasion. Preslia 89: 203–274.
Reino L, Figueira R, Beja P, Araújo MB, Capinha C, Strubbe D. 2017. 
Networks of global bird invasion altered by regional trade ban. Science 
Advances 3: e1700783.
Riley S. 2005. Invasive alien species and the protection of biodiversity: The 
role of quarantine laws in resolving inadequacies in the international 
legal regime. Journal of Environmental Law 17: 323–359.
 Riley S. 2009. Preventing transboundary harm from invasive alien species. 
Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 
18: 198–210.
Rockwell-Postel M, Laginhas BB, Bradley BA. 2020. Supporting proactive 
management in the context of climate change: Prioritizing range-shift-
ing invasive plants based on impact. Biological Invasions 22: 2371–2383.
Rodier G, Greenspan AL, Hughes JM, Heymann DL. 2007. Global Public 
Health Security. Emerging Infectious Diseases 13: 1447–1452.
Roy HE, et  al. 2018. Developing a framework of minimum standards for 
the risk assessment of alien species. Journal of Applied Ecology 55: 
526–538.
Ruckert A, Zinszer K, Zarowsky C, Labonté R, Carabin H. 2020. What 
role for One Health in the COVID-19 pandemic? Canadian Journal of 
Public Health 111: 641–644.
Ruger JP, Yach D. 2009. The global role of the World Health Organization. 
Global Health Governance 2: 1–11.
Schrader G, Unger JG, Starfinger U. 2010. Invasive alien plants in plant 
health: A review of the past ten years. Bulletin OEPP: EPPO Bulletin 
40: 239–247.
Seebens H, et al. 2017. No saturation in the accumulation of alien species 
worldwide. Nature Communications 8: 14435.
Seebens H, et al. 2018. Global rise in emerging alien species results from 
increased accessibility of new source pools. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences 115: E2264–E2273.
Seebens H, et  al. 2020. Projecting the continental accumulation of alien 
species through to 2050. Global Change Biology 27: 970–982. doi.
org/10.1111/gcb.15333.
Shimura J, Coates D, Mulongoy JK. 2010. The role of international organ-
isations in controlling invasive species and preserving biodiversity. 
Revue Scientifique et Technique: Office International des Epizooties 
29: 405–410.
Shine C. 2007. Invasive species in an international context: IPPC, CBD, 
European Strategy on Invasive Alien Species and other legal instru-
ments. Bulletin OEPP: EPPO Bulletin 37: 103–113.
Stoett P. 2007. Counter-bioinvasion: Conceptual and governance chal-
lenges. Environmental Politics 16: 433–452.
Stoett P . 2010. Framing bioinvasion: Biodiversity, climate change, security, 
trade, and global governance. Global Governance 16: 103–120.
Stoett P, Roy HE, Pauchard A. 2019. Invasive alien species and planetary 
and global health policy. Lancet Planetary Health 3: E400–E401.
Taylor AL, et al. 2020. Solidarity in the wake of COVID-19: Reimagining 
the International Health Regulations. Lancet 396: 82–83.
Tsai FJ, Turbat B. 2020. Is countries’ transparency associated with 
gaps between countries’ self and external evaluations for IHR 
core capacity? Globalization and Health 16: 10. doi.org/10.1186/
s12992-12020-10541-12993.
Webber R. 2019. Communicable Diseases: A Global Perspective. CABI.
Welfens PJJ. 2020. Trump’s trade policy, BREXIT, corona dynamics, EU 
crisis and declining multilateralism. International Economics and 
Economic Policy 17: 563–634.
Zahrnt V. 2011. Transparency of complex regulation: How should WTO 
trade policy reviews deal with sanitary and phytosanitary policies? 
World Trade Review 10: 217–247.
Philip Hulme (philip.hulme@lincoln.ac.nz) is a distinguished professor of 
plant biosecurity at Lincoln University, in Canterbury, New Zealand, and 
leads the biosecurity research theme in the Bio-Protection Research Centre, 
one of ten National Centres of Research Excellence in New Zealand.






/bioscience/article/71/7/708/6158362 by Lincoln U
niversity Library user on 13 July 2021
